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The rise of populism currently stands as a severe threat to a slowly developing Eastern Europe. Nowadays, one of the most noticeable figures in this region became Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia and Viktor Orbán in Hungary – the active users of populist approach and false promises. We dived into the Balkan domestic and foreign politics and tried to analyze this approach, why is it working and do they really protect their nations or just ensure their hold on power? In this research, we will try to answer these questions and create a more realistic image of the current political situation in Eastern Europe.
Aleksandar Vučić: a mastery of historical manipulations
Young Aleksandar Vučić during his work as a Minister of Information
The first article of the Eastern European block of the project is dedicated to Alexandar Vučić. To begin with, let us dive into his biography for a moment: The future Serbian president made his first steps in politics when he joined the Serbian Radical Party (whose beliefs and views will play a crucial role during his presidential terms) and a few years later, at just 24 years old became a party secretary. During his first tenure in civil service, he was also appointed as a Minister of Information and was widely known for his nationalistic serbo-centrist rhetoric and bias toward the anti-NATO narratives. However, in the 2000's, after Slobodan Milošević was arrested, the public disapproval of the Serbian government became more noticeable, so Vučić eventually left civil service and distanced himself from ultra-nationalists.
His second coming to politics started in 2008 when Vučić established the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and tried to win voters’ voices using pro-European views, which became extremely popular during the time, as their neighbours – Romania and Bulgaria, were accepted into the EU a year earlier. Using this approach he slowly gained popularity among the voters and was first appointed as a Prime Minister in 2014, and won the presidential election in 2017. However, despite the claimed European orientation, Vučić’s policymaking included close cooperation with Russia and China, constant historical references and promises of greater Serbia, which we can see even today.
Domestic policy
Now, we will analyze Alexandar Vučić’s populism practices with concrete examples in domestic policy. The first important issue that needs to be mentioned is the political consolidation around him in Serbia. For instance, at the last general elections in 2022, Vučić gained approximately 61% of the votes, while his party ”Serbian Progressive Party” completely crushed their opponents in local and parliament elections, receiving a majority in all national assemblies. Despite a huge number of supporters, such a dominant position compared to other political actors presents a perfect opportunity for Vučić's much-loved media manipulations and silencing of the opposition. All these actions are currently being justified because of the protection of national interests and stability of the country, but despite these made-up reasons, it is a democracy, that takes a hit. According to the Freedom House report, in 2024 Serbia scored only 18 points in the “Political Rights” category.
Another important problem that is worth mentioning is the constant usage of financial aid to shift the voters' attention from real problems. Before the previously mentioned elections of 2022, Vučić and his party gave special monetary packages to Serbian citizens, specifically targeting elderly people and low-income workers in the process. Various reports later showed that these measures were not budget-efficient and economically justified. Overall, the so-called Vucic’s promotion of national interest and continuous prosperity in reality, is just a populist shouts, using Serbia's tragic past and the desire of citizens to get much-needed stability in life, which allows the current government to keep itself in power and continue to weaken democracy.
Aleksandar Vučić's political rally in Belgrade
Foreign policy
Moving to Serbia’s foreign policy, it is impossible to imagine it today without various alliances with Russia and China. By doing so, Vučić is trying to present his country as a bridge between the Eastern and Western worlds. However, despite continuous cooperation with the mentioned countries, Vučić kept his first pre-election promise regarding EU integration, which started back in 2012 when Serbia received the official status of the EU candidate. Yet, Chinese (and usually state-subsidized) companies are currently the largest investors in Serbia (China Observer, 2023), and Russian-owned companies are declared as the highest profitable in the country, making it obvious that Vučić intends to be able to integrate more into the European Union, but also keep receiving benefits from much-valuable cooperation with Putin and Xi Jinping.
Moreover, it is impossible not to mention the very complex and long-lasting problem of the Kosovo region. Vučić, who was a noticeable and dedicated member of a nationalist party, constantly reminds the intentional community about his position on this question, which is again being largely supported by masses in Serbia, mostly from ones who are still traumatized from 1990’s conflicts in former Yugoslavia. For example, during his visit to Kosovo in 2018 he publicly supported Slobodan Milošević’s actions regarding this region and the Serbian minorities who lived there - the move which was seen by experts as the historical and political claim for the disputed region.
To sum up, Vučić’s international approach mostly resonates with his nationalistic past. The Serbian president perfectly understands the weakness of the Balkans and the “pain points” that can be used to gain popularity and support. While his domestic politics are aimed at distracting from economic problems and suppressing democratic processes, international politics is promoting balance between the EU and Russia or China. Even though these practices can help Vucic remain in office, they will take a toll on Serbia and its citizens due to the inconsistency of its government. The same problem also exists in neighbouring Hungary, which we will discuss further.
Viktor Orbán: A Putin’s best friend, an EU funds beneficiary
The second article of the project's Eastern analysis is aimed at an even more controversial figure – Viktor Orbán. Once again, for a better understanding of the figure of the current Hungarian prime minister, we need to trace back his biography: Viktor was born in the small provincial city of Székesfehérvár. After he graduated from university with a bachelors degree in law in 1987, he went to study for a year at the University of Oxford. Such an excellent educational background will be extremely helpful for Orbán during his civil service and lawmaking processes. In 1988 he, similarly to Vucic, was one of the establishers of his party – Alliance of Young Democrats or simply Fidesz, which was promoting free election and withdrawal of the Soviet army from Hungary. However, when Viktor became a party leader in 1990, he drastically changed Fidesz’s course and proclaimed the party as a conservative one.
Ten years later, he was appointed as prime minister for the first time and held his position till 2002, but lost the elections and had to resign. Later, in 2010 his party won another parliament election and he was appointed as a Prime Minister once again. Now, he learned from his mistakes and started the transformation of the political and social landscape of the country, using such methods as state control of the media, reduction of electoral districts and ultimately passing of a new constitution, where law education has played its part. All these steps helped Orbán to dominate politics inside the country and eliminate any noticeable opposition, so now he is the longest-serving head of state in the EU and third longest in Europe, only being left behind by Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin. A good company for the democratic leader isn't it?
Viktor Orbán at Oxford University
Domestic policy
Starting again from domestic policy, during his second tenure as a prime minister Orbán completely changed his approach towards it. He immediately expressed his support to all ethnic Hungarians, allowing them to participate and vote in all future elections, gaining a lot of supporters in the process. Next, his party changed parliament's ballot procedures, so the Fidesz who had two-thirds of all votes could adopt any necessary decision or law and this is exactly what happened during the voting for constitution reforms and the media act. All these events raised concerns from independent Hungarian scholars and speakers, so Orbán stated that these steps were necessary to protect the country's freedom and sovereignty. As a result Freedom House labeled Hungary as a“partly free” country, so was it worth it? Unfortunately, it is a rhetorical question.
Next, similarly to the Serbian government, Orbán and his party used the strategy of financial aid to boost its support. During the COVID-19 pandemic instead of investing in the research and medical sector of the economy, they presented a vast program of monetary support, which was extended in the form of tax breaks and low mortgage rates for families. Experts reacted negatively to these steps, as they believe it would not boost or stimulate the post-COVID economy to a necessary extent before the 2026 elections and only serve as a “bribing” of Hungarian voters. Overall, we can clearly see that Orbán prioritizes complete control over internal politics and short-term wins to competitiveness and future benefits, as it endangers his leading positions.
Foreign policy
Moving to Orbán’s foreign policy, it also promotes earlier mentioned Hungarian sovereignty. Lately, despite the country being in the EU, the talks about mutual discontent between the two parties can be heard more and more often. For example, according to the European Parliament after Hungary refused to eliminate its violations in the judiciary and legislation blocks the EU froze its funds for an estimated sum of 50 billion euros. In return, Orbán stated that Hungary is being punished for protecting its independence and that the European Union interferes in the internal affairs of Hungary – an answer that surely will not change much in Brussels, but will surely be supported by the people of Hungary.
Another important issue of Viktor Orbán’s international politics can be seen regarding his position on the Russian-Ukrainian War. While he stated support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine at the beginning of the war, he did not condemn Russian actions after the annexation of the Crimean peninsula back in 2014 and is known to have a close realtionship with Vladimir Putin. Moreover, he believes that Russia’s leadership was quote-to-quote “hyper rational” during recent events (Reuters, 2024). All of these statements presented the Hungarian prime minister as a person who wants to benefit from both the EU’s funds and Russian energy sources supply. To support this argument, Carnegie Europe reported that Orbán refused to sanction the Russian energy sources sector as it would disrupt Huguries energy stability. Then, China also decided to invest in this Balkan country, boosting its infrastructure in exchange for access to its internal market, which also threatens the whole EU. In general, almost like his Serbian colleague, Viktor Orbán balances between two sides of the world, earning benefits from each of them, promoting only Hungarian interests, and doing all of that while being a part of the European Union.
Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán during their meeting in Budapest
Overall, Orbán's work as the head of Hungary showcases the perfect example of the price of internal and external populism. Inside the country, he ensured his hold on power and his longevity inside the political office but severely breached the democratic norms of the EU. Similarly, on the world stage, he put his interest, in making allies with Russia and China over protecting common values and prosperity of the EU. Similarly to Serbia, Hungary is experiencing positive at-the-moment results, but the future for Hungary is uncertain, as the country can simply face further isolation and block of much-needed financial help from the European Union as the discontent in Brussels continues to rise.
Will their power survive when the bill comes due?
Dennis Chernov
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